Imagining the Mediterranean from Spain: Orientalism and Modernity in the symbolic universe of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

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ABSTRACT: Due to the political transition to democracy, together with the international standardization in an European and Western sense and the settlement of a democratic foreign policy, Spanish policy would experience a “Mediterranean turn”, especially in the Barcelona’s Process. Namely, for the first time in the 20th Century, since the late 80’s Spain would state and implement a real Mediterranean policy. A policy which was conceived out of the logic of the Europeanization and the standardization in Europe and the Western system. From this new central position the old images and prejudices about his southern neighbors would converge, mostly shared with other European neighbors –members of the EU-. Images and prejudices that depict remains from Orientalism and political, economic and cultural inertia of Modernity.

KEYWORDS - World Politics, Spanish Foreign Policy, Mediterranean, Orientalism.

I. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Spanish foreign policy focused on the south. The new imperial project wove its geo-cultural universe from an orientalism profile -arabism and africanism- in the Spanish case. The historical awareness of relations with its southern neighbours, the redirection of Spanish foreign and security policy in the early twentieth century and the notion of the Mediterranean border were articulated over this symbolic net. In the absence of a Mediterranean policy, concentrated on its Moroccan projection for much of the century, the Mediterranean was a cornerstone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, the search for solutions to its strategic poverty and, ultimately, Spain’s involvement in the era of imperialism and decolonization.

The Mediterranean -says Susana Sueiro- was the priority of its international plan for much of the century, to the point that ‘the Mediterranean policy represented, in fact, its entire foreign policy’. This is true in a limited sense since the Mediterranean which captured the attention of Spain was limited to a very specific area, close to its southern shores: The Strait of Gibraltar and North Africa. All within a geostrategic axis: the Canary Islands-Gibraltar-Balearics. ‘There is no Mediterranean global policy’, it would be more appropriate to refer, in the words of the author- to ‘Moroccan politics’, as it would be the ‘question of Morocco which absolutely and overwhelmingly dominated Spain’s relations with European powers of its environment’.

Spanish politics took a ‘Mediterranean turn’ with the transition to democracy, international and Western European approval and the formation of a democratic foreign policy. This ‘turn’ is the focus of attention in this paper. That is, for the first time since the late 1980s, an authentic Mediterranean policy was formulated and executed. A policy designed from the dynamics of Europeanization and full integration into Europe and the Western system. Old images and prejudices of the Southern Neighbourhood rose up from its new central position. These were largely shared by other European neighbours (EU-members) with their visible orientalist remnants and political, economic and cultural inertia of modernity. The Union for the Mediterranean would try to find solutions to new security issues and challenges of the -occidental, Spanish- European and the

Mediterranean border in the post-Cold War world, designing arguments, eminently modern mechanisms and strategies in a liberal sense. This would be designed and would usher in practices from the logic of Europeanization of public policy, especially foreign policy and security. In short, ‘Spain wanted to make clear that it was a European country in the Mediterranean region, not a Mediterranean country in Europe’.

The ‘Mediterranean turn’ in foreign policy during the governments of Felipe González between 1982 and 1996 was established around a series of clues comprising the Mediterranean dimension of Spain during the twentieth century: its semi-peripheral condition, its tendency between its drift toward the centre of the international system and its peripheral projection, particularly towards its Mediterranean overseas; the view of the Mediterranean basin as a border for Spain and the European and Atlantic institutions under the North-South divide during the Cold war period; the lack of Spanish strategy focused on the Mediterranean, specifically over the Canary Islands-Gibraltar-Balearics axis. These are essential keys to analyse the circumstantial horizon that would crystallize into the ‘Mediterranean turn’. Defence Minister Narcis Serra, emphasized in an appearance before the Committee of Defence January 29th, 1990, the need to promote a move towards the south Mediterranean in Europe. There was a need for policies to improve European security by establishing mechanisms for economic, cultural and political cooperation to promote stability.

This assumes a Spanish foreign policy that gives a new meaning to its projection towards the Mediterranean, as peripheral projection, in the light of its European and Western condition. It seems appropriate, and this is the main purpose of these pages, to analyse the geocultural net on which this speech, and this projection of power of Spain’s Mediterranean policy is established, as a public policy within the European Union. This speech and a projection of power in terms of foreign policy, regarding unparalleled elements and past inertia to dissect Westernized and Eurocentric logic from which Mediterranean policy was conceived in democratic Spain are points to reflect upon. The construction of the historical image of the other, in this case southern neighbours, inversely illustrates international the self-constructed image by the Spaniards in politics, and high and pop culture.

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This approach is substantial, in analytical terms, to the relationship between power and knowledge, and particularly the notion of ‘symbolic power’ which in the words of Pierre Bourdieu was conceived as follows in French:

(...) comme pouvoir de constituer le donné par l’énonciation, de faire voir et de faire croire, de confirmer ou de transformer la vision du monde et, par-là, l’action sur le monde, donc le monde, pouvoir quasi magique qui permet d’obtenir l’équivalent de ce qui es obtenu par la forcé (physique ou économique), grâce à l’effet spécifique de mobilisation, ne s’exerce que s’il est reconnu (...) Ce qui fait le pouvoir des mots et des mots d’ordre, pouvoir de maintenir l’ordre ou de le subvertir, c’est la croyance dans la légitimité des mots et de celui qui les prononce, croyance qu’il n’appartient pas aux mots de produire.

3 S. Sueiro Seoane, La política mediterránea..., 193.
5 Pierre Bordieu Langage et pouvoir symbolique, Paris, Editions Seuil, 2001, p. 210. I thank Melody Fonseca for her theoretical reflections and suggestions made in her doctoral thesis Raza, poder e identidad en las prácticas discursivas de Estados Unidos sobre Haití: una perspectiva decolonial (2016) which is in its final drafting stage at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and whose debt is reflected in these pages.
As the power to create the proposal by the wording, to make see and believe, confirm or alter the worldview and, with that, the action on the world, therefore the world, an almost magic power that provides the equivalent of which is obtained by the forced (physical or economic) due to the specific effect of mobilization, which is exercised only if it is recognized (...) what makes the power of words and slogans, to maintain order or subvert it, is the belief in legitimacy of words and the one who utters them, a belief that shall not be created by words.

Both, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault avoid the construction of a general theory of power, and concentrate their interest in criticism of the exercise of domination placed in time and space. Michel Foucault maintains a distance from approaches that formulate power as hierarchically organized, arranged in terms of domination and subordination and measured by exploitation, as the ones from structuralist, functionalist, pluralistic theories or networks. Foucault is interested in the very notion of power and who exercises it, and the analysis of how and through what mechanisms it is exercised 6.

In this regard, Foucault’s reflection on the links between power and knowledge is crucial, since they directly and mutually implicate one another. ‘There is no relationship of power without correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, and no knowledge that does not involve or constitute power relations at the same time’7. According to these premises, knowledge is structured as a system of thought that becomes a socially legitimized and institutionalized control system. Production of truth is essential in the association between knowledge and power. The exercise of power is not possible, argues Michel Foucault, without a certain economy of truth. The establishment of a verediction regime determines law production and generates a speech that projects in the exercise of power. Consequently, knowledge would be nothing more than a statement that becomes truth in a discourse and a specific practice of power, at a certain time 8.

The role played by governmentality, understood by Michel Foucault as the exercise of power over the population through exercises of sovereignty, disciplinary tactics and administrative practices that seek a certain kind of comprehensive control over the population 9, is critical in building determining identity and otherness. The construction of modern state and the role of identity construction are connected with the imperative of safety. The construction of citizenship under the umbrella of a common identity tends to make foreign everything that is seen as different. In this regard, foreign policy serves as a speech and a practice that tend to project that phenomenon beyond national borders and where the construction of the foreign derives, likewise, from the constitution of the domestic. As David Campbell states: ‘Foreign policy is a part of a multifaceted registration process that disciplines the men framing them into spatial and temporal organization of inner and outer, self and other; for example in the state’10. The imperatives of safety and attachment to order do not only impel the State to exercise control over the population within its spatial limits, but also encourage the practice of colonialism and imperialism. Thus, Mark B. Salter argues: ‘civilized / barbarian discourse also brings our attention to imperialism, and the way in which it is central to our understanding of international history and international relations’11.

Racism, to which we return on analysing geoculture in the modern world-system, is an underlying central element in the construction of identities and the external projection of modern states. Designed as a social construction through scientific and cultural statements, Racism has served different purposes of domination, control and governance over the other. As Melody Fonseca rightly argues, when she analyses this concept over a long period, since the eighteenth century the new logic of domination and the emergence of the first post-colonial societies across the Atlantic were giving way to the creation of a racial discourse based on pseudo-scientific statements, which shaped a biological and anthropological knowledge about race. With the development and strengthening of States and national communities from the second half of the nineteenth century, they would settle under the shelter of narratives based on race and social Darwinism 12. Other

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7 Michel Foucault, Vigilar y castigar. Nacimiento de la prisión (Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2013) 34.
12 Following rational naturalism according to which those who were not Europeans in a biological sense were inherently inferior, racial historicism, as David Theo Goldberg argues, would be an argument under which the non-European or non-
definitions of racism, including Immanuel Wallerstein or Balaibar studies, elaborate on segmentation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ racism. The first refers to the practices and discourses about races in pre-World War II and it is largely understood as scientific racism, where various human groups were classified in racial terms. And the second would be linked to cultural differences, which makes of these alleged differences a nodal argument of containment practices or conversion of otherness. Thus, from the postmodern approaches and cultural studies, where we find the thoughts of Aimé Césarie, Frantz Fanon and Homi Bhabha, racism would be addressed in a more complex and transversal perspective, both in its relationship to cultural politics of representation and the link between sexualisation and racialization of the other. Colonialism abounding in the ideas of Frantz Fanon would be a structural and systematic denial of multiple worlds and people and the reconstruction of their representation from the generated fragmentation since colonialism.

Roxanne Lynn Doty argues, from the panoramic of postcolonial and de-colonial approaches to international relations, which largely illuminate our analytical approach, that the term race evolved around explicit doctrines of inequality and contexts in which these doctrines justified exclusionary practices, intimately connected with slavery and imperialism practices. Therefore, these approaches present an area to describe and explain racism according to its relation to other discourses based on progress, civilization and democracy.

The speech was forged from the combination between power and knowledge. This, as Melody Fonseca argues, would be generated at an event in which certain knowledge takes the form of statement and is reproduced through a concrete practice of power. The speech, in the words of Frantz Fanon, is the act of speaking, ‘to use certain syntax, possess the morphology of this or that language, but above all to assume a culture, support the weight of a civilization’.

Postcolonial criticism raises a space for discussion and analysis of statements and visibilities and invisibilities of knowledge. (the regime of truth, in short) and colonial and racialized discourse. Thus, according to Melody Fonseca, speech and identity practice through various power devices would generate colonial and racist relationships that would allow control, containment or attempt to convert subordinates into the notion of a superior race or culture. De-colonial thinking, critical towards cultural reductionism of Anglo -postcolonial studies, proposed a heterarchical understanding of power relations in which capitalist relations of production are understood not only as a process of production of surplus value but also as a construction of colonial and subaltern subjectivities which formed the modern / colonial world system. Thus the colonial discourse, based on power and knowledge, was part of a power device that could be understood as the coloniality of power, a term originally coined by Aníbal Quijano. In this regard, Orientalism illustrates textual construction relevant to understand power relations at the construction of a colonial subject.

In the specific and modest framework of our work, where we investigate the Orientalist echoes of the current Mediterranean policy of Spain, Orientalism clarifies as part of a verediction scheme and a mode of governance that, subsequent to its recent historical context, would merge with a redirection of position and willingness of Spain towards the Mediterranean. This would be a discursive net on which the weight of the past would converge under the semi-peripheral component modulation of Spain, and its European and Western accommodation during the twentieth century. Thus, this is an exploration around textualism and context of the international system.

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European descent were not inherently inferior, but were historically immature or less developed. This would become the axis line of thought of John Locke and John Stuart Mill, the English school of political economy, historical materialism of Karl Marx and ultimately colonial policies of assimilation, development and progress (see Ruth Wodak y Teun A. Van Dijk (Eds.), *Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States* (Austria, Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, 2000) ans David T. Goldberg, *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

SPAIN AND ORIENTALISM IN GEOCULTURE OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.

The nature and evolution of the international system form a decisive framework to specify dominant historical processes and actors, and how the condition and Mediterranean projection of Spain influence international relations. In reference to the nature of the international system under its geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural profiles in the course of the twentieth century, this backdrop is undoubtedly essential to assess and clarify the position and the international integration of Spain.

Spain’s semi-peripheral status was not only highlighted in geopolitical and geo-economic level, according to its dependence on global power centres since the early nineteenth century, but also and very substantially in the geo-cultural framework. Spain’s semi-peripheral status was penalized in the second design of the modern/colonial world system, despite its prominence in the first modern/colonial world system, this is, in words of Walter D. Mignolo: in the sixteenth century from the momentum Orbis Universalis Christianus which was consolidated with the ‘defeat of the Moors, the expulsion of the Jews and the “discovery” of America’. As well as the relocation of boundaries and limits of Christian cosmology humanity. A design sprouted under the leadership mantle of England and France since late eighteenth century. Over time, the notion of hegemony of ‘Christian mission’ was replaced by ‘civilizing mission’, although the first did not fade completely. The Standard of Civilization arose with the emergence of the secular state, with the change of intellectual spirit introduced by the Enlightenment. Space dominant in the minds of colonial expansion preceding stage, gave way to time. The latter realigned universal history, from late eighteenth century, and became the ‘essence’ of modernity. ‘Linear time in world history was also embedded in the very idea of the civilizing mission: to be civilized is to be modern, and be modern means to be in the present’. Consequently, ‘the denial of the contemporaneity became one of the most powerful strategies for colonialisat power in languages, cultures and knowledge subordination’.16. Racism and ‘European’ white supremacy were erected as one of the foundations of new hegemonic discourse of European imperialism. The imagination of the modern/colonial world system placed knowledge’s production in Europe. Modernity was imagined as the home of epistemology. In short, Gerrit W. Gong highlights several trends that consolidate the idea of civilization and the civilizing mission in sixteenth and nineteenth centuries:

The tendency toward secularization is clearly connected, in complex ways, with distant origins of modern science, the beginnings of the idea of progress, the first historical criticism to biblical records, the discovery of true nature of great religions and cultures of the world, in brief, with many of the same influences that contributed to emergence of standards of ‘civilization’. These influences questioned Christian elements initially implicit in the identification of international society with Christianity and helped to replace it with a canon based on a more general and abstract idea of modern ‘civilization’17.

For that matter, Alicia Campos Serrano argues that:

(...) The worldview that legitimized the expansion of Europe, conceived a world composed of Western states that, under a sacred trust of civilization, had the right and moral ‘load’, poetically expressed by Kipling, to illustrate and discipline all those populations considered as wild and backward. Europeans saw themselves as agents of a linear history of progress, the last of whose stages

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was occupied by Western industrialized societies. This evolutionary conception of cultures, which was a relatively recent phenomenon in European literature, was becoming the hegemonic idea.18

Since late nineteenth century until World War II, the civilizing mission, in its European version was rebuilt around the United States when it started its rise as world power, restructuring it with Manifest Destiny. Henceforth, ‘development’ and ‘modernization’ took over the ‘civilizing mission’. The notion of ‘development’ as nodal concept of modernization polarized the global hegemonic colonial design in the modern/system from the imprint of American hegemony. The notion of development was presented after the Second World War as an essential anchor of scientific social thought, in economics, in addition to economic history, together with sociology and other social sciences.

Finally, efficiency and markets took charge and placed development and modernization as a necessary condition of final objectives of transnational capitalism. In terms of globalization, colonial difference has been replaced by a new form of colonialism of power, no longer located in a nation-state or a group of nation states, but as global transnational coloniality and trans-state. It makes sense to consider liberalism as a new form of civilization and not only as a new economic organization. Globalization would thus become an image of the new civilizing design. The current phase of globalization has the market as its ultimate goal. This object can renounce to values attributed to civilization, since the aim of expanding the market does not require the conversion of people to Christianity or citizenship. In the words of the philosopher Bernard Stiegler this would be evidence of “modernization without modernity”.19

This domination’s epistemology emerged with its own manipulation of science and social knowledge, as Immanuel Wallerstein rightly illustrated, according to the rise and nature of political science, economics and sociology geared mainly towards the civilized world State (modern). However, there was a social need to explore the world beyond the West. Indeed, the period 1850-1945 was the heyday of imperial expansion, and the five countries France, Britain, Germany, Italy and the United States that made up the ‘core of social research’ were heavily involved in this expansion. If the above disciplines were inadequate to study what remained outside Western instruments, other forms of social research were proposed: anthropology and Oriental Studies.20

Anthropology, on the one hand, was seen as the study of peoples called ‘primitive’. Who were the primitive peoples? During this time the answer was obvious: most non-white human populations living under the aegis of the Western peoples. However, the characteristic traits of these primitive peoples could not be applied to all non-Western areas: China, India, Persia and the Arab-Islamic world. All these civilizations became the domain of Oriental Studies. In the architecture of modern social knowledge, Orientalism, as a central issue of reflection in our work, featured, according to the American intellectual of Palestinian origin Edward Said, a triple definition. First, the most accepted, an academic study of the East by Western scholars, even more incomprehensible as the social knowledge specialized in the light of the Americanization of social sciences and the establishment of area studies (cultural studies areas). Secondly, ‘a style of thought - in the words of Edward W. Said, which is based on the ontological and epistemological distinction made between East and -most of the times- West’. A difference assumed by writers and intellectuals who provided the basis to elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political reports concerning east. And finally, a more historical and material approach than the aforementioned which could be defined as a ‘collective institution that relates to the East, a relationship that involves making statements about it, taking positions on it, describing it, teaching about it, colonizing it and deciding on it’. As such, ‘it is a western style that seeks to dominate, restructure and have authority over East’. In this regard, the relationship between East and West is textual. Orientalism is understood as a discourse through which the ‘European culture has been able to manipulate and

18 Alicia Campos Serrano, La aparición de los estados africanos en el sistema internacional: la descolonización de África, in Francisco José Peñas (Ed.), África en el sistema internacional. Cinco siglos de frontera (Madrid, Catarata, 2000) 17.
even lead East from a political, sociological, military, ideological, scientific and imaginary point of view’ since the Enlightenment”.

Inseparable from the notion of West and West, the origin of the latter as a political and civilizational entity traces back, in the words of writer and cultural critic Ziauddin Sardar, to the sixteenth century. And it is precisely in the ‘clashes between Christianity and its nearest neighbour, Islam, where we must seek the origins of Orientalism, as well as much of its history’. The first time that: ‘the West developed its vision of the Orient as a mysterious, exotic and erotic place, where mysteries and cruel and barbaric scenes took place, was at the time of contact with Islam’. Thereafter, the Protestant Reformation and the rise of the Ottoman Empire influenced markedly influenced the transformation of Christianity in the “West”\(^\text{22}\). It was not until the staging of the European imperialist project, according to the penetration in India, China, Middle East and Africa as well as the very globalization of the international system with the addition of new powers like the United States, when the expression ‘west’-and ‘the West’ - definitely acquired a political and civilizational range.

Spain’s case has particularities underlined by Edward W. Said, as a result of the extremely complex and dense relations between Spain and Islam in historical and geographical terms. In this connection, Islam formed ‘part of Spanish culture for centuries, more than anywhere else in Europe, and the echoes and patterns that remain of that relationship continue nourishing the Spanish culture to this day’. Spanish Orientalism, unlike the other European powers (Britain, France or Germany) does not manifest itself exclusively as an imperial relationship. In these states, East is created by ‘conquerors, administrators, scholars, travellers, artists, novelists and poets’; it is ‘something that is “out”’. In Spain, however, the imperial dimension, which undoubtedly exists and nourishes much of the culture originated by Orientalism, is interwoven by the historical fact that ‘Islam and Spanish culture live one another rather than confronting with belligerence’\(^\text{23}\), a look from within its own culture and history, as well as the own thoughts on the identity of the Spaniards.

This double dimension of Orientalism in Spain’s case moves to the field of cultural production, and even political culture, in particular towards Arab world and the Mediterranean. Spanish Arabic studies in modern times, as Miguel Hernando de Larramendi points out, were developed from the eighteenth century in parallel to the needs of African and Mediterranean policy of Charles III. During the nineteenth century the school of Arabic studies, of philological foundation, and focused on the study of Al-Andalus, was consolidated. The Spanish colonial experience in northwest Africa had a limited impact in the development of Arabic studies, which continued to be focused on the study of their ‘domestic East’. Unlike France and Britain, the ‘Spanish Arabists university graduates were not actively involved in the colonial adventure’. Africanists were linked to the projection into the next Mediterranean-African overseas, and they elaborated most of the studies on North Africa, basically Morocco and Western Sahara\(^\text{24}\).

The official attitude of the Spanish government influenced, according to Vicente Moga Romero, the division between the ‘academic Arabism and militant Africanism with an ideological wedge centred on ethnic and religious determinism’. A legacy which remained unchanged for decades, and continues to set the itinerary of current Maghreb studies\(^\text{25}\).

Africanism, since the mid-nineteenth century, was referred to, argues Federico Villalobos, those who, as individuals or as part of institutions or groups of opinion, claimed ‘the existence of vital interest to Spain

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\(^{22}\) Ziauddin Sardar, Extraño Oriente..., 18-20.

\(^{23}\) Edward W. Said Orientalismo..., 9-10.

\(^{24}\) Miguel Hernando de Larramendi and Bárbara Azaola, Los estudios sobre el Mundo Árabe y Mediterráneo contemporáneo en España, Investigando el Mediterráneo, CIDOB, 2006, 87.

beyond the south of Gibraltar Strait (strategic, economic, historical and even moral) and advocated for decisive action by both the state and private initiative in defence and promotion of these interests.\textsuperscript{26}

The modelling of the Africanist discourse was transmitted into the account of the history of Spain, through textbooks since the time of the Restoration and most of the Spanish twentieth century. David Parra insists on how these texts began to include references to:

\textit{(...)the Universal mission of Spain, its moral superiority, the strategic character of the Maghreb (considered vital to security and national independence) or some alleged historical rights from the Middle Ages that served to legitimize, in the context of imperialist division, the Spanish North African intervention.}\textsuperscript{27}

This discourse has been tempered according to various domestic and international historical tendencies of Spain during the century, the return of Maghreb and the Mediterranean twist introduced substantial changes in the narrative, that still lack a profound intellectual and rigorous reflection transcending the remnants of Orientalism. The author wonders about the place of the traditional ‘other’, so present in earlier times, in the story, and he says:

\begin{quote}
The negative images that characterized the Moroccans for decades have disappeared. However, the alternative has not been the construction of a new discourse, devoid of prejudice, approaching their culture, social organization or situation before the arrival of the colonizers. Nor is there a reflection on the construction of otherness and uses of its stereotyping. Moroccans have become notably absent from the Spanish colonial story.\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

\section*{III. THE SEMI-PERIPHERAL STATUS OF SPAIN AND THE ‘JOURNEY TO THE CENTRE’}

The Mediterranean projection of Spain faithfully illustrates the tension centre-periphery when defining its position in the international system throughout the century. Roberto Mesa stressed from a structuralist perspective, the peculiar position of Spain in the tension centre-periphery. He highlights a convergent inertia towards the centre, by virtue of its Europeanness, coexisting with projection lines to the periphery under its Mediterranean and American dimension.\textsuperscript{29} Spain, in the opinion of Javier Ordoñez and Alberto Elena, could be ‘considered beyond any doubt as an example of semi-periphery’ throughout the nineteenth century (though we would extend it to the twentieth century). In a sense, it would behave like virtual periphery of great scientific and technical centres to which Spain was ‘a complete technological branch’. Nevertheless, Spain did not stop harbouring colonial ambitions and exercising ‘a certain scientific and technological influence’ in its colonial possessions and areas of influence.\textsuperscript{30}

The semi-peripheral status of Spain has been portrayed in the debates and challenge around modernization (Europeanization / Americanization) since the nineteenth century. The course of regeneration and foreign policy redirection in that context, from nationalism and imperialism coordinates, in the Mediterranean area, nourish from the exemplary effect of European powers, as visible icons of civilization. In this regard, the role played in the development of Spain’s Mediterranean policy, in geocultural key, with Africanism as intellectual, political and propaganda support for the new colonial adventure is symptomatic.

Professor José María Jover defined the position of Spain in the nineteenth-century world politics as ‘a small power, located in such a peripheral position regarding the peoples’ protagonists, and so radically

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\textsuperscript{26} Federico Villalobos, \textit{El sueño colonial: las guerras de España en Marruecos} (Barcelona, Ariel, 2004) 55.
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\textsuperscript{27} David Parra, \textit{El colonialismo español en Marruecos en el ámbito escolar. Evolución histórica y finalidades socioeducativas, Didáctica de las Ciencias Sociales, Geografía e Historia. Iber,} 76, April-May-June 2014, 26.
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\textsuperscript{28} Ibídem, 31.
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\textsuperscript{29} Roberto Mesa, \textit{La posición internacional de España. Entre el Centro y la Periferia,} Leviatán, 33, 1988, 39.
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introverted, that it neutralized the strenuous activity of its internal struggles and tensions with near absolute international passivity.\(^{31}\)

At the height of colonial expansion and imperialism, the overcoming of the 1898 crisis and the incorporation in the international system was woven from the nearby overseas (the Mediterranean and African overseas). Indeed, the adjustments in the Mediterranean and the configuration of the new status quo in North Africa at the dawn of the twentieth century, led Spaniards to a new encounter with Europeans overseas. Ultimately, ‘it is a wrong approach -in the words of José María Jover- to search for the main reference of Spanish perception of European conflicts, before the twist of the thirties, in the continent.’\(^{32}\) Spanish-European relationships, therefore, were not established in political and diplomatic terms, through the continental connection but through a peripheral connection. Thus, the new window and overseas colonial enterprise in Africa erected a privileged channel to insert Spain in the international system, under the Franco-British tandem until the outbreak of the Civil War.

After the Civil War, the long period of General Franco’s dictatorship, introduced major changes in foreign policy in step with the evolution of the regime itself for the sake of its survival and the transformation of international society. According to Florentino Portero and Rosa Pardo, Franco’s New Spain led to a break with its liberal and diplomatic tradition.\(^{33}\) Undoubtedly, the Regime’s foreign policy contained elements of rupture with the liberal tradition since its gestation in the civil war. It abandoned the tradition of neutrality towards European conflicts and marginalized Franco-British axis in favour of its new allies, Germany and Italy.

However, there was not a structural change from the perspective of overseas policy. It was the interests, ambitions and overseas projection of Spain that injected a greater dose of dynamism into the European policy of Spain. It is true that political-ideological factors, such as anti-communism and the rejection of democracy and liberalism, play a very important role, but in our opinion, the ‘imperial dream’ towards North Africa and the Hispanic project as a sort of informal imperialism, play a major role in the realization of the European policy of the regime.

In our view, the structural change in foreign policy guidelines towards overseas world began to take shape as the regime’s international isolation exceeded the Second World War and crystallized its alignment with the West and its insertion into the Atlantic and European coordinates. The geopolitical component of the international position of Spain between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean played an essential role in this process.

The abandonment of neutrality and the commitment to the alliance with the United States and, consequently, limited Atlantic and European integration must be analysed in relation to other processes and key events in Mediterranean Spain’s condition such as decolonization, whose repercussions were felt in the regime since the fifties. Decolonization changed the perception of Mediterranean affairs entirely. Also, we should mention the exploitation of policy options oriented to overseas historical scenarios: Latin America and the Mediterranean. The Latin American policy and the approach to the Arab world played an essential role in the design of substitution policies to seek a better international arrangement.

The process, under which the overseas window would no longer be the favourite channel connection with the centre of the international system, was not achieved until the transition and consolidation of democracy in Spain, as well as full international approval. Indeed, international standardization and normalization of international relations paved the way for the structuration of a democratic foreign policy and the relocation of Spain to the centre of the international system, within the modernization process driven by political change. At the end of the eighties, Spain abandoned its eccentric position, fully immersed in the process of European integration and in the Atlantic institutions, and with better balanced ties with the United States. Henceforth, its

\(^{31}\) José María Jover Zamora, **Política, diplomacia y humanismo popular en la España del siglo XIX** (Madrid, Turner, 1976) 86.


central position in the international system determined its relations with the periphery and historical scenarios overseas, both to Latin America (term that was standardized) and to the Mediterranean world.

In this process, after the upheavals of 1989, the Gulf War in 1991 and the adaption to uncertainties of the post-Cold War world, the adjustments of Spanish foreign policy were made from within its European and Atlantic commitments and collective complicity. Once the priorities and preferences in foreign and security policy were defined, the design and formulation of an authentic Mediterranean policy was carried out within this network of complicity. The overseas window stopped being the access channel to the core of the international system, to become a stage projection of assimilation, design and formulation of policies designed from the centrality that characterized the new international position of Spain.

This is how the concept of an authentic Mediterranean policy evolved. A process in which the institutionalization of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, despite its shortcomings and flashes, had its starting point in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in 1995. A process in which the Atlanticist and European perception of the Mediterranean converged with the secular notion of border that Spain had played in contemporary history.

IV. THE BORDER IN THE TEXTUALITY OF SPAIN'S MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

Concerns about the security of the Mediterranean under Spain's permanent condition of border derived from the frontier character of the Mediterranean and the perception, the collective imagination and the interpretation that historically has permeated the collective mentality of Spanish society. In this complex set of experiences, the Mediterranean, say Fernando Martín Lopez and Francisco A. Muñoz can turn into both: a ‘tangle that separates, acts as border acting or a communicative space, according to our capacity to understand and live its wealth’34.

The Mediterranean, often a place of exchanges and meetings, has repeatedly been a fault line of confrontation and antagonism35. This image began to crystallize between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries under the intense contact between the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal and The Barbary Coast36. Antagonisms that since the nineteenth century have worsened under the European expansion. In fact, as Pedro Martínez Montávez emphasized, the Mediterranean way ‘is, in first and last instance, the route of colonial penetration. Arabs, almost unanimously, see it and feel it that way, as a material and symbolic reality’37. It demarcates a geo-historical spatial border between two worlds: the West and Islam.38 The border experience of Spain in the Mediterranean is primarily due to the vulnerable nature of the southern flank and is, therefore, a cornerstone of its security. However, its understanding and its analysis is attached to long-term cultural and historical experience, in which the contact avalanche has generated a network of representations to both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar, that would have to refer ultimately, to the Mediterranean as a stage on which a mental or symbolic boundary is projected39.

The Mediterranean border has, in Spain’s case, specific conditions under its unique geostrategic imperatives, its resources, its regional ambitions and its border historical experience. The new Mediterranean coordinates, since the beginning of the twentieth century underpin the secular tendency to polarize the border to the south, as a historical conditioning, whose perception refers, in the words of José María Jover - ‘not only to...

34 Fernando Martínez López-Francisco A. Muñoz, El reconocimiento de la paz en las culturas políticas mediterráneas, in Fernando Martínez López-Francisco A. Muñoz (Eds.), Políticas de paz en el Mediterráneo (Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2007) 14.

35 See Samir Nair, Mediterráneo hoy. Entre el diálogo y el rechazo (Barcelona, Icaria, 1998) 11.

36 See Víctor Morales Lezcano, España y el mundo árabe: imágenes cruzadas (Madrid, AECI, 1993) 61.


38 See Noureddine Affaya-Drriss Gerraoui, La imagen de España en Marruecos (Barcelona, CIDOB, 2005) 36.

the existence of a political subdivision or a delimitation of civilizations, but to an antagonism between the Spanish and Moorish40. European and Muslim. This notion is widely socialized in the historical consciousness of the Spanish people, and it is based on a past conflict with the other shore of the Mediterranean, which reached the climax of its symbolic value during the Civil War due to the role played by North Africa and the participation of the ‘Moors’ between rebel forces.

During General Franco’s dictatorship it did not lose its border condition and acquired new forms of expression as a result of decolonization and Moroccan independence in 1956. Thus, it created a lengthy period of litigation around Spanish presence in North Africa, and the Mediterranean polarization due to East-West confrontation, especially after the power vacuum left by old European colonial powers in the fifties.

The perception of the Mediterranean as a border deepened due to the fracture between North and South embodied by Atlantic and European perceptions, in the context of uncertainty generated after the Cold War. For this reason, the southern border of Spain became the southern border of Europe in the process of redefining the new spaces and threats within the Atlantic and European institutions.

The existing conflict in the Mediterranean basin, in the light of problems arising from migration flows, economic, social and cultural inequalities between the two shores, and the generalization of Islamist terrorism threat has helped to entrench threat perceptions and enhance slogans like the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ coined by Samuel Huntington. Nevertheless, it also led to evaluate in depth the need for progress on the path of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue as the best guarantee for peace and development.

The Mediterranean as a crossroads, as a meeting point and conflict area, has catalysed and nuanced the wealth of the imaginary that Spain and Spaniards have shaped over centuries of contact, and transformed by the peculiarity of Spain’s history and Islam as a neighbouring and primal East; a backdrop that was projected in Spanish political culture and worldview and, in particular, its immediate Mediterranean and Atlantic surroundings. And in this regard, it penetrated its perceptions, analysis and conceptions of security.

V. SECURITY AS A KEYSTONE OF MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

The problem of Spain’s security in the Mediterranean is a constant, by virtue of its geopolitical importance, and it highlights the changes and permeability of the concept of security in the light of changing regional circumstances, and the own nature of international system during the twentieth century.

One of Madrid’s key concerns, after the 1898 crisis, in the context of colonial adjustments of the century in North Africa, was to seek an international guarantee for its territorial integrity, whose vulnerability had been evident during crisis in the late 19th. The International Guarantee was associated with the establishment of a new status quo defined by London and Paris under the Entente established in 1904 and later adopted in the Cartagena Accords in 1907. As Ambassador León y Castillo stated in his memoirs: ‘Morocco is not only a matter of honour for us, but a matter of border and national security”41.

The quest for security was formed under characteristic mechanisms of diplomacy prior to the Great War, in this case the practice of entente. Later, the creation of the League of Nations, and the implementation of guidelines and collective security mechanisms introduced new expectations on security. In this regard, interests and modest colonial ambitions -with the war in Africa as a backdrop to carry out the occupation of the Protectorate which was not concluded until 1927, during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera-influenced Spanish policy in the League of Nations. Furthermore, the practice of collective security, whether through negotiations on disarmament or either through expectations for the conclusion of a Mediterranean pact, affected perceptions of security and stability in Western Mediterranean.

The international situation of Spain in the second post-war period was very precarious, after the Civil War and the vagaries of Franco’s regime. Concerns about security took place in two parallel planes where the regime could not undertake supplementary action. On the one hand, there were concerns arising from the process of decolonization. The military and strategic failure, regardless of other considerations such as consistency and the opportunity to persevere in the routines of colonial policy in the process of emancipation of

40 José María Jover Zamora, La percepción española..., 11.

41 Fernando León y Castillo, Mis tiempos, vol. 2 (Madrid, Sucesores de Hernando, 1921) 126.
‘overseas peoples’, was highlighted in the war of Ifni and its subsequent retrocession to Morocco, and then in the unfortunate outcome of Western Sahara.

On the other hand, in the context of the Cold War, Spain’s incorporation in Western security system through the back door of Washington, under the Covenants of 1953, highlighted the asymmetry of Spain regarding major international powers and its geostrategic value according to its location on the map. In short, the Iberian Peninsula gave depth to the defence of Western Europe against the ‘most likely enemy of NATO’.

The political and military analysts of the regime of the fifties, such as Luis Garcia Arias, Enrique Manera and Camilo Barcia Trelles, valued the geostrategic asset of Spain, not only in terms of the Atlantic but asserting the Mediterranean dimension of Spain for Western security. However, the asymmetry and Spain’s dependence of the United States, perceptible from multiple points of view in the content development of the Covenants, materialized in the modest modernization of its armed forces, pointed exclusively around the needs of Western defence, rather than Spain's own strategic specificities.

Spain’s journey to the centre of the international system, which took place in transit to the consolidation of democracy, crystallized with the instauration of its democratic foreign policy and the definition of its international position from its Atlantic and European anchors. The Decálogo para la seguridad de España (Decalogue for the safety of Spain) presented by the government of Felipe González before Congress on October 23rd, 1984 was a reflection of this process, that ended with the entry into the European Communities and the referendum on NATO held on March 12th, 1986; a process that clarified, not so much the Spanish presence, but the way to participate and the very concept of security policy. This journey finalized in 1988 on the signing the Protocol of Accession of Spain to the Western European Union and the signing of a new defence agreement with the United States, similar to those signed with other European allies.

After a long journey, Spain in the words of Fernando Moran was finally ‘in its place’. Security policy in an increasingly globalized world was only feasible within multilateral forums.

The Euro-Mediterranean framework was particularly sensitive to the instability and uncertainty generated by the end of the Cold War. Since the nineties, the debate about security in the Mediterranean gravitated mainly on two issues: on the one hand, the nature of the problems affecting security; and on the other hand, the reflection on the most appropriate architecture for basin’s stability.

The revival of Spain’s interest in the Mediterranean in the nineties, and its role in building new channels within the Global Mediterranean Policy took place in this context of increasing awareness of the instability of the basin in the world post-Cold War. This rediscovery of Mediterranean policy in Spain followed new international factors in the Mediterranean framework: the reality of a growing wave of immigration from southern Mediterranean; instability in the Maghreb and the Middle East and the threat of radical Islam; and the emergence, in all its magnitude, of North-South fracture after Cold War, staged on the southern flank of Europe. A horizon that strengthened, among the political and military, a shared sense of vulnerability arising from the geographical position of Spain and the tendency to Europeanize the solutions to these challenges.

The Europeanization of the Mediterranean policy, and the adaption to the profound changes in international arena following the end of the Cold War, were woven from these bases. In this regard, in what way and from what approaches were the Mediterranean policy and the search for answers to the uncertainties in the Mediterranean basin forged?


44 Fernando Morán, España en su sitio (Barcelona, Plaza & Janés/Cambio 16, 1990).

45 See S. Sueiro Seoane, La política mediterránea..., 104-195.
Security occupied a prominent place not only for the size, complexity and global nature of the uncertainties and risks, but also because of the new meaning of the concept that eventually overwhelmed its strategic, political and military component, which until now had described its agenda.

Any assessment of the means and instruments and conceptual tools of foreign policy and security, Spain, throughout these years and especially in the post-Cold War world, and its projection on its political Mediterranean agenda, make it advisable, in our opinion, to raise a general approach to changes in the concept of security, and the role of the Mediterranean in the international agenda as border and fracture, but also as the setting for regional interaction.

The changes and uncertainties that characterized the post-Cold War world illustrated with all its breadth, from the perspective of security, that the nature of it came defined by its multidimensional and global character. The spheres of the national and the international become intertwined, and so should be excluded, as Celestino del Arenal said, the obsolete idea that:

(...). Security is exclusively a function of national power or military and economic strength. States must frequently encounter circumstances beyond their control in the search for solutions to the problem of insecurity, such as structural economic crisis, and economic, demographic, environmental and financial trends to which the only solution is common actions and solidarity.

The Mediterranean took on a strong role in the Cold War, as one of the scenarios, which expressed tension and structural fracture lines in the international arena, with higher density and sharpness. The Mediterranean portrayed in its two basins, the huge fracture between North and South, between centre and periphery, which emerged, since the nineties, in all its complexity and comprehensiveness. As Ricardo Mendez and Silvia Marcu state, the Mediterranean is, since the nineties, the scenario of inherited conflicts from the Cold War and the decolonization process, but also of tensions derived from the new geopolitical scene. The fracture between North and South, says Paloma González Minho, is a ‘constant in contemporary international society, but it is possibly in the Mediterranean area where the effects of this polarization are most visible’. The Mediterranean ‘is the area of the world to present the wider differences in income per capita in such a small geographical area’.

Since the nineties, the Mediterranean and the notion of border, which has constantly accompanied Spain in the course of the century, converged with perception and the demarcation of new borders for European and Atlantic institutions. It has become, says Ignacio Fuente Cobo, one of the ‘preferred areas of focus for security and regional defence organizations and European states on the northern shore of the Mediterranean’.

The Euro-Mediterranean framework was particularly sensitive to the instability and uncertainty generated by the end of the Cold War. Since the nineties in the words of Elvira Sánchez Mateos, a ‘new security agenda’ emerged in the Mediterranean region in which ‘environmental, economic, social and domestic policy - migration, pollution, human rights violations- were included along with military threats to security’. ‘Security concept became the quest for certainty by the societies and states in the conservation of their economic, territorial and cultural integrity, along with other goods and value’. To sum up:

(...). States continue to rely on military power to guarantee their safety, but the war as a means of regulating relations between states appears as obsolete in the internal context of the ‘Western’ world.

46 See Esther Barbé, Relaciones internacionales (Madrid, Tecnos, 1995) 279.


49 Ignacio Fuente Cobo, Las políticas de seguridad y defensa en el Norte de África, in Evolución geopolítica del Norte de África. implicaciones para España, Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa, 10, Ministerio de Defensa, 2007, 11.
because of shared cultural values, mutual understanding, the existence of common interests and integration institutions.\textsuperscript{50}

The increased complexity in security and the search for new architectural pillars to promote stability in Spain’s case, took place at the same time as the Europeanization of the means of external action and Mediterranean policy.

The new Euro-Atlantic anchors of Spain determined, from the eighties, its outreach to peripheral scenarios in the Mediterranean-African and Latin American world to which it did not stand as a separate party but with its new European and Western identity. Security policy in an increasingly globalized world was only feasible within the multilateral mechanisms and practices.

Spain, as Susan Sueiro rightly states, has played a very prominent role in European awareness about the existence of a threat from the southern Mediterranean and the convenience of dealing with it not only in a political and strategic way but by promoting economic, social and political development of the countries of the South Bank. In sum:

The idea is that it is useless to make Europe a fortress, it is impossible to isolate it from the unstable southern Mediterranean establishing a sanitaire cordon; the migration phenomenon is unstoppable if we do not look for long-term solutions to reduce inequalities and imbalances between the two sides. There is a north shore where there is a compact and structured entity, the European Union, which contrasts sharply with the failure of the structure or regional integration in the southern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{51}

The dynamic role of Spain regarding the Europeanization of its Mediterranean policy and European and Atlantic awareness of the Mediterranean since the beginning of the 1990s was highlighted on the basis of its active role in bringing new issues to debate in the European and Atlantic Agenda as: interdependence North-South, the very notion of ‘interests mattress’, the projection of the European model towards the Mediterranean, or the promotion of initiatives such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. The role of Spain in the opinion of Richard Gillespie, was favoured by: the Spanish flexibility to promote multilateralization of Mediterranean policy and its diplomatic skills to find complicity within the European Union to rebalance attention between East and South.\textsuperscript{52}

The perception and conception of security towards peripheral scenarios, and especially the Mediterranean as an area of prime interest in terms of security, has led to an active policy in various European and Atlantic multilateral forums-the Atlantic Alliance, the Western European Union and the European Union. The European Union crystallized the most ambitious and comprehensive initiative at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in November 1995; the Barcelona process. The Spanish initiative, one of the most outstanding achievements of the Spanish diplomacy in the decade besides the Madrid Peace Conference on the Middle East showed, as Susana Sueiro accurately points, the overcoming of:

(...) their restricted historical view of the Mediterranean and its southern border (i.e. basically its relations with Morocco). Spain wanted to expand the traditional exclusive focus of its Mediterranean action to adopt a comprehensive approach, precisely in order to try to convince the

\textsuperscript{50}Elvira Sánchez Mateos, Europa y la seguridad global en el Mediterráneo, CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals Magazine, 57-58, 2002, 20-21. See, also, the work of Milagros Álvarez Verdugo, La política de seguridad y defensa en la Unión Europea (Madrid, Dykinson, 2004).

\textsuperscript{51}Susana Sueiro Seoane, La politica mediterránea..., 197-198. In an appearance of Defense Minister Narcis Serra, before the Committee of Defense January 29, 1990, he emphasized the need to promote a Mediterranean twist in Europe, to towards the south. There was a need to encourage policies to improve the European security by establishing mechanisms for economic, cultural and political cooperation to promote stability (Comisión de Defensa, n. 20. Cortes Generales. Congreso de los Diputados, 29 th January 1990, p. 204, www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Publicaciones (February 10th, 2020).

\textsuperscript{52}Richard Gillespie, España y el proceso euromediterráneo, in Bernabé López García-Miguel Hernando de Larramendi (Eds.) España, el Mediterráneo y el mundo árabo-musulmán. Diplomacia e historia (Barcelona, Icaria, 2011) 276-277.
European Union member countries - and other multilateral forums where it is present, such as NATO or the WEU CSCE (later OSCE) - that the Mediterranean is an area of vital strategic importance for Europe and not just for its southern members (...) Spain focused all the weight of Mediterranean policy to get Brussel’s financial support for the development of the southern Mediterranean, but at the same time, continued to make every effort to defend its hard-won position of privilege within the European Union vs. Mediterranean third countries.

The Barcelona Conference endorsed the new global dimension of the Mediterranean policy. The aim was to turn the Mediterranean basin into an area of cooperation, peace, security and welfare, and to promote the idea of a partnership, or association-agreements, in the Mediterranean. In Barcelona participated, in addition to the Member States of the European Union, twelve Mediterranean countries non-members of the EU: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.

The final document of the Conference was structured around three pillars, inspired by the system of baskets of the Helsinki process: political and security partnership; economic and financial cooperation; and cooperation in social, cultural and human affairs. The central axis around which the Barcelona Process revolved was the economic and financial partnership, which contained a major package of financial aid managed by the MEDA program, but with a design which was derived from security premises and the pursuit of stability in the Mediterranean. The first pillar, of particular political importance, collected principles already included in other documents on international security: respect for the right of self-determination or non-intervention in countries internal affairs, among others, together with new principles at a regional level, such as promoting regional security, stability and prosperity and cooperation in prevention and fight against terrorism. The possibility, in the long term, of establishing a Mediterranean Pact or of reaching an agreement on a future Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Security was envisaged in this chapter. The prominence of security concerns was evident in the third pillar, where in addition to socio-cultural cooperation, intergovernmental cooperation was considered, focusing on problems of terrorism or illegal immigration. In the latter domain, they developed convergence efforts and geoculture cooperation.

VI. THE TEXTUAL NET OF DEMOCRATIC SPAIN’S MEDITERRANEAN POLICY: ORIENTALIST ECHOES

In the staging of Spain’s Mediterranean policy, coexisted elements of continuity with the emergence of elements of change and revision regarding the nearest overseas. The underlying elements of Orientalism-Africanism in Spain’s case remained in force, particularly in relations with the Maghreb.

In terms of images and perceptions of the period between 1975 and 1986, Spanish-Moroccan relations were turbulent, in line with the legacy of tensions around the decolonization process and disputes that marked the agenda of Rabat and Madrid. A situation, as Eloy Martín Corrales well qualifies, aggravated by new factors in the international environment and the negative impact of three events for the Arab-Muslim perception in the West: firstly, the Arab-Israeli war and its consequences for the exorbitant rise in oil prices; secondly, the increase in the armed struggle carried out by Arab organizations, ‘condemned terrorism’; and finally the significant Islamic revolution in Iran, ‘responsible for the birth of fear of the Islamic wave’. In short, the image of ‘Arab-Muslims suffered a significant deterioration, that was extended to all countries and people of this cultural-religious sphere. The negative perception of Moroccans was updated with new stereotypes generated in places far away from the neighbouring country.

53 Susana Sueiro Seoane, La política mediterránea..., 199.

54 See Laura Felipe-Mónica Salomón, La dimensión sur de la UE: políticas para el Mediterráneo, in Esteher Barbé (Coord.), Política exterior europea (Barcelona, Ariel, 2000) 200-207. This way, in the opinion of Secretary-General for Foreign Policy, Villar Ortiz de Urbina, the willingness manifested at the European Councils of Corfu and Essen to boost the Mediterranean policy and provide the Mediterranean Spain’s sensibility, was materialized (Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores, n. 396. Cortes Generales. Congreso de los Diputados /21st December 1994, 12247-12248, www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/Publicaciones (February 10th, 2020).

Tensions on bilateral agenda failed (the failure of the decolonization of the Sahara, the claims of Ceuta, Melilla, and fishing conflicts) continued to sow discord and to feed the flow of inherited stereotypes of the past. The graphic catalogue of images of the south, particularly of Morocco, in line with these pitfalls, splashed satirical graphic chronicle that appeared in magazines such as El Papus or El jueves, but also daily and weekly newspapers such as Cambio 16 or Triunfo, among others. They collected the negative view of the Arab-Muslim projected in comics as El Guerrero del Antifaz, El Capitán Trueno or Audaces Legionarios, whose speech had become outdated and were renewed with ‘direct and fresh’ language. They knew how to express, in an ironic and iconoclastic tone, the development of neighbourly relations with Morocco.

New issues slowly emerged, such as drug trafficking or the emergence of North African immigration from the seventies and eighties, that began to worry some sectors of society and Spanish press. The establishment of democracy in Spain and the incorporation at instances of European integration had a decisive effect on the course of the textual dynamics and persistence of these Orientalist prejudices.

The process of Spain’s democratization and full incardination in its frame of Western European reference modulated Mediterranean world perceptions, on which these centre-periphery fractures took place. The awareness of the importance of Mediterranean’s future for stability and peace of the Basin determined the visions regarding south. In Spain’s case, especially in relation to its nearby southern Mediterranean periphery, the Maghreb, new factors joined the international agenda, especially in the case of Morocco. Among these new factors mainly two stood out: immigration and the threat of radical Islam, more virulent and widespread since the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the breaking out of an authentic civil war in Algeria in early 1992.

Immigration is a new phenomenon in contemporary Spain. The immigration problem did not provoke a genuine debate in Spanish society in those years. In the absence of this debate, as Eloy Martín Corrales rightly says, all platforms, almost without exception (political institutions, universities, media, citizens’ associations, publishers, among others) confronted the issue from a ‘benevolent and receptive optical to newcomers’. It was assumed that the ‘whole of Spanish society welcomed, with a more or less intense dose of tolerance and solidarity, the Maghreb immigrants arriving in Spanish territory’.

The graphic treatment of the immigration, and in particular the Maghreb problem (the ‘return of the Moors’ in the words of Víctor Morales Lezcano), in the media has been characterized by ‘constant denunciation of the harsh conditions they suffer while trying to reach Spain and subsequent living conditions they must endure’. Images published in the press, especially the cartoons published in newspapers, underpinned the idea of Europe, and Spain as part of it, like an impregnable fortress or picturing the Strait - ‘Shipwrecked Strait’- as the scene of unfortunate human tragedy that the clandestine voyages often ended up being.

Once the process became more critical, it was evident that initial tolerance towards immigration -in particular Maghreb - especially in places where the phenomenon was more pronounced, had disappeared. In addition, literature and cinema tried to promote greater social awareness of the, mainly illegal, immigration problem.

Despite the politically correct path of the press in general, and the work of social awareness of immigrant population problems by NGOs, trade unions and also from public institutions, outbreaks of racism have not ‘occurred as a result of the struggle for work’, nor as a result of threats such as Islamist terrorism, but
because of ‘everyday living’. These new realities, especially immigration and, more distantly, the threat of radical Islam, along with the historical problems present on international agenda with neighbouring Maghreb, emphasized the persistence of negative prejudices towards Islam and Morocco. Eloy Martín concludes: ‘(...) It is not an isolated phenomenon (...) but something much deeper, a sense of the Maghreb that is strongly anchored in the collective Spanish imagination’.

The rediscovery of the Mediterranean from the nineties ushered in a Mediterranean policy development, where Maghreb occupies a central place. This policy has resized from its European and Western connotations considering the entire Mediterranean Basin, due to geo-historical reasons and global challenges that are reflected in Western Mediterranean, in central-peripheral terms.

This interest in the Mediterranean from Europe and the West had an impact on the interest of public opinion and the academic and intellectual community. This rediscovery of the Mediterranean was also reflected in the specific area of Morocco, traditional axis of the Africanist literature, in a discursive reformulation of the Moroccan question, in which new generations of researchers introduced new research approaches. Despite this review of the Moroccan question, old ghosts and past disagreements persisted.

The significance of Mediterranean issues and the concern from intellectuals and academics resulted, especially in a growing concern about Morocco, in the revision of the colonial past and the process of decolonization and a cultural approach to more recent problems. The ‘return of the Rif’ is symptomatic, not only academically but also in cinema and literature. In Spain, says Vicente Moga, rather than a ‘historical memory’ of the Protectorate, there is a confusing ‘sentimentality’ about the historical reality of this period, which has led to the assertion that the Spanish imaginary ‘still lives off Tarik and Muza Rif’. Nonetheless, contemporary problems and experiences, the aforementioned on immigration, and others, such as the demands and tensions between Rabat and Madrid because of Ceuta and Melilla, and other disputes regarding security were disseminated.

On the domain of interdisciplinary plan of studies on the Arab world and contemporary Mediterranean, and according to the assessments of the excellent state of this issue of Miguel Hernando de Larramendi and Barbara Azaola, changes in Spanish society and international framework also had a profound impact in the academic landscape and the pulse of institutions and civil society.

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61 Eloy Martín Corrales, *La imagen del...*, 244.

62 See, for this matter the Works of Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-Aurelia Mañé Estrada, (Eds.) *La política exterior española hacia el Magreb. Actores e intereses* (Barcelona, Ariel, 2009) and Bernabé López García-Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, (Eds.) *España, el Mediterráneo y el Mundo árabo-musulmán. Diplomacia e Historia* (Barcelona, Icaria, 2010) in addition to other contributions made by authors such as Richard Gillespie y Raan Rein.

63 See Vicente Moga Romero, *La cuestión marroquí..., 76 and ff.

64 We refer in this regard to the excellent study of Vicente Moga Romero, *La cuestión marroquí..., 107 and ff.

65 Ibidem, 123.


67 Such would be the case for example of the work of Alberto Pertejo-Barrena Aláiz-García, *La tierra del sur* (2005) where a war with Morocco is staged over disputed island Almadán -Perejil, asks Vicente Moga to himself?; and the novel of captain Antonio Ruibériz de Torres-Sánchez, *El hombre de Nador* (2006) that recreates a conflict with Morocco, under the reign of Mohammed V, which takes place around a new Green March, this time against Melilla, ‘the European city closer to the desert’.

68 Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-Bárbara Azaola, Los estudios sobre el Mundo Árabe y Mediterráneo contemporáneo en España, in *Investigando el Mediterráneo* (Barcelona, CIDOB, 2006) 91 and ff.
The return of the Mediterranean was accompanied by greater attention from the academic community towards Spanish policy on the area and the development of some connecting bridges between academic and professional circles. Since the eighties, diplomats responsible for Maghreb matters initiated a process of opening the academic world and civil society ‘seeking feedback for the development of a policy towards the region’. In this context, the meetings of Encuentros de Gredos, were organized between 1986 and 1989 by Professor of Economic Theory at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Alejandro Lorca, with the support of Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe (the Institute for Cooperation with the Arab world). These meetings stimulated channels of connection with the academic world that were intensified in the nineties. In this context, as Miguel Hernando de Larramendi and Barbara Azaola studied, the creation of a Mediterranean policy was accompanied by a growing interest from the scientific community. The development of research on the Arab and Mediterranean world lacked, however, a stable fabric of specialized research centres in the region. This was improved later with the creation of Casa Árabe (the Arab House), dependent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headquartered in Madrid and under the direction of Professor Gema Martín Muñoz.

Finally, the attention of the think tanks and Spanish international relations centers toward the Arab world have not had in global terms, according to Miguel Hernando de Larramendi and Barar Azaola, an ‘outstanding weight’ despite the importance of the Mediterranean region in Spanish foreign policy. The only exception in this regard was the creation in 1987 of the Institut Català d’Estudis Mediterranis (Catalan Institute of Mediterranean Studies, ICEM), later called Institut Catalá d’Estudis i Cooperació de la Mediterrània (Catalan Institute of Studies and Cooperation at the Mediterranean), under the Generalitat of Catalonia. In 2002, it was consolidated under the name of Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, (European Institute of the Mediterranean, IEMED). The IEMED cooperates also with the Observatorio de Políticas Mediterráneas (Observatory of Mediterranean Policy), under the European Studies Institute of the University of Barcelona. In other centres and think tanks like CIDOB (1973) and the Centro Español de Relaciones Internacionales (Spanish Centre for International Relations, 1992-1999) the interest in Arab world and the Mediterranean is included in the parameters of a broader interest agenda.

The Barcelona Process as a more elaborate result of Mediterranean policy harboured this agitation in professional, academic and intellectual circles. Both, governmental initiatives and those emanating from civil society in the context of the Barcelona Process tend to continue along the path of building bridges and channels that enable knowledge to overcome barriers and dilute existing prejudices in relations between the Mediterranean communities.

In this respect, there were different initiatives, illustrative of this intellectual atmosphere such as: the Comité Averroes (Averroes Committee), in the particular field of Hispanic-Moroccans relations, academic activities involving researchers and makers of public policy, in addition to other concerned circles of Mediterranean affairs as the ones encouraged by the CIDOB; the Instituto Europeo del Mediterráneo (European Mediterranean Institute), the Instituto de Paz y Conflictos de la Universidad de Granada (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Granada) and the Red Andaluza de Investigación para la Paz y los Derechos Humanos (Andalusian Research Network for Peace and Human Rights), among others.

VII. CONCLUSION

Under this background horizon and as a conclusion, the concept of security, in its complexity and integrity, obeys a predominantly liberal vision, because it was based on the a priori that the Barcelona process would encourage a ‘virtuous circle’. This would be, in short, from the sharp analysis of Bichara Khader, director of the Centre for Studies and Research on the Contemporary Arab World at the Catholic University of Lovaina:

(...) The liberal recipe in its most orthodox version of deregulated markets, would supposedly increase the attraction of the Mediterranean area for local and international, private and public investors, which should encourage competition in the region, stimulate growth and, ultimately, reduce

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69 Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-Irene González González-Bárbara Azaola, El Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y la política exterior hacia el Magreb, In Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-Aurelia Mañé Estrada (Eds.), La política exterior hacia el Magreb. Actores e intereses (Barcelona, Ariel-Real Instituto Elcano, 2009) 73.

70 Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-Bárbara Azaola, Los estudios sobre..., 87-147.
migration pressures and as a result the ‘Islamist opposition’ and ‘social upheavals’ would weaken; this would result in stability in the Mediterranean region.

This optimistic scenario of stability by means of ‘economy’ was combined, from the European point of view, with another scenario, equally optimistic, of a stable democracy and peace. Here the hypothesis postulated that economic development induced by open markets and their exposure to international competition, attraction of foreign investment and privatization, would eventually extend the ‘middle class’, democratic transformation vectors.

The difficulties in the development of the Barcelona Process were varied in nature, in addition to the ones properly derived from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The fundamental problem is, as Susana Sueiro reminds us, structure. The ‘terms of trade are not just when northern countries impose very advantageous conditions for them’. ‘Rhetoric discourse of politicians and statesmen in the EU on the urgent need for a Mediterranean cooperation policy, contrasts with the realpolitik, in which national interests prevail’. Spain is a living example of the ambiguity of EU Mediterranean policy, since it was promoting the development of an ambitious global policy towards the Mediterranean, but was reluctant to make concessions to the countries on the southern shore if these affected national interests. Richard Gillespie stresses the double perception of Spain by southern neighbours: on the one hand as a ‘bridge’ between north and south and, secondly, as a bridgehead of the West or of the European Union in the adjacent South.

According to Elvira Sánchez Mateos, there is another issue: the lack of a common culture in the Mediterranean, where a culture of European security, global and cooperative, converges with a culture of Arab security, also in debt to the Cold War, but subject to other influences such as ‘the game of superpower alliances looking for clients in the Middle East and the Maghreb, the consolidation of postcolonial states, the conflictual nature of regional policy and militarization of regimes’. Military forces radically differ in the Mediterranean basin regarding their place in their State and their relations with their societies. So, while the ‘military leadership of the North, in the words of María Dolores Algora, are devoid of political power by the internal development of European states, in many Arab countries they take part in the process of government decisions.

The economic crisis and the Arab revolution illustrated the mirage of the liberal project of the European Union. The economic downturn collapsed the first step of the process toward Westernization and the construction of democratic peace. The policies implemented by the European Union to the southern border and from Spain, in the context of Europeanization of its Mediterranean policy on the Barcelona Process, and its overall policy towards the Maghreb, show the persistence and inertia, as well as the adaptation of liberal postulates to the exercise, of an asymmetrical political practice, based on intellectual components where the echoes of Orientalism and the primacy of West Europe remain.

Some critical approaches in the international relations theory, as Melody Fonseca emphasizes, agree that the end of the Cold War, not without some nuances, was the ‘Back to the Future’ of Eurocentrism and Occidentalism prevailing in global politics of nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It was a liberalism that, as one of the main ideologies of modernity, was established, in the words of Michel Foucault, as a culture of danger. A culture characterized, firstly, by building political discourse and practice around danger and polarized around the freedom-security debate; secondly, governability practice-oriented to control social bodies,

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72 Susana Sueiro Seoane, La política mediterránea..., 200.

73 Richard Gillespie, Spain and the..., 160.

74 Elvira Sánchez Mateos, Un marco de análisis para el estudio de los actores y los procesos de toma de decisiones, in Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-Aurelia Mañé Estrada (Eds.), La política exterior española hacia el Magreb. Actores e intereses (Barcelona, Ariel, 2009) 22.

75 María Dolores Algora Weber, El Ministerio de Defensa español como actor de cooperación internacional en la seguridad y la defensa del Magreb y del Mediterráneo, in Miguel Hernando de Larramendi-Aurelia Mañé Estrada (Eds.), La política exterior española hacia el Magreb. Actores e intereses (Barcelona, Ariel, 2009) 105.
standardization and homogenization of society as a counterweight to freedom; thirdly, the paradox inherent liberalism of enlargement and universal freedoms through controls and interventions; and finally, the use of scientific statements and regulatory regimes, to display their technical control of freedom and security strengthening.66

In the development of the international order after the Cold War, mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the President of the United States George HW Bush proclaimed a ‘new world order’ in 1991. This order emerged on the horizon as a new era based on the thesis of democratic peace, the foundations of which included the conviction that democratic states often do not make war on each other, and they are frequently more hostile to those states that are undemocratic. On the backstage of the new democratic order based on peace rest old remains of modern world system: an evolutionary conception predetermined by the notion of progress and also the contrast between ordered societies, or against those who are not.

In perspective, as Melody Fonseca notes, there are three constants flowing in the tradition of liberal political culture: first, liberal thought rests on a notion of supervised freedom, under which the order is inherent to responsible exercise of freedom; secondly, the liberalism (as reflected in postcolonial and decolonial criticism) acts through exclusionary practices, so that it fragments the space between those involved in this area of regulation and those who are excluded from it. This evolves over time, from the standard of civilization in the course of the nineteenth century until the interwar period in the twentieth century, through the logic of development projected into the spaces of formal decolonization and reformulated from the canon of democracy, market and liberal economy in the Cold War; and finally, the persistence of racism as a constant discourse of liberal political culture, in its imperialist / anti-imperialist aspects and its forms of containment / conversion of otherwise. The construction of modern Western knowledge on the basis of subjectivity and epistemology of others, concludes the cited author, serves as a manifestation of knowledge and power for continuous playback of racialized subjectivities on which the ‘objective’ knowledge of the West can act as epistemology home.

The post-Cold War liberalism, says John M. Hobson77, extends a formal veil to dissociate itself from the colonial, imperialist and racist nineteenth past, but its inertia and its aftermath, including Orientalism, last and are reformulated in its speech and power strategies. In his book The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics. Western International Theory this author refers to the presence of Eurocentrism in the dominant theories of international relations in the last two decades; Western realistic and Western liberals. In both cases the ‘Back to the Future’ is revealed in the return of the racist realism of 1889, realistic approach and Eurocentric paternalistic liberalism of 1830 in the analytical perspective of the Liberals. Under the realist perspective after the Cold War, brings to light a pessimistic view that linked to the conflict primacy of Huntington’s thesis about the clash of civilizations, which resumed the Hobbesian echoes on international milieu anarch as a constant threat to the stability of organized communities. For analysts such as Robert Kagan, Paul Kennedy, Zbigniew Brzezinski or Nial Ferguson the way to address these threats meant the implementation of exclusion and containment. The urge to be proactive in the face of international threats would implement a reconstruction interventionist discourse that would go beyond the containment of otherness, to bet on a fair interventionism that was not to be understood as imperialism. Moreover, from the perspective of Western liberalism, the line of action had to move toward conversion, considering it as a champion of a new era culturally tolerant and anti-imperialist compared to the liberalism of the nineteenth century. Aligned with the optimism of Fukuyama, authors like Brett Bowden or Gerrit Gong, insisted in the metahistorical logic of a linear conception of time centred around the idea of progress, and in which once overcome the nefarious authoritarian and imperialist past habits, provided an opportunity to complete the project of universal democracy. They would proclaim a new democratizing standard. The conversion would be equally associated with the supremacy of a system, but would also promote an internal differentiation in relation to how it conceptualizes others, enabling idealistic practices of conversion and pragmatic practices of conversion. So against the universal and disseminated democratic peace, in cases where liberal democracy has not meant a pacification / civilization state, it is argued that it is the result of endogenous components of these societies.

Containment and conversion are, therefore, very present in the theory and practice of the Mediterranean twist of Spanish policy within its European framework and context. And they are represented not only in the framework of the Mediterranean policy within the European Union but, also in the redirection of its policy towards the Maghreb.

66 Michel Foucault, Seguridad, territorio, población..., 86-87.
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